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Abstract
In this contribution, we investigate the impact of different institutions on ethnic 
minorities’ political support. Based on a hierarchical cross-country comparison, 
we first show that individuals belonging to ethnic minorities have less national 
identity than the majority groups within the same country. We then test whether 
this negative effect of belonging to ethnic minorities can be attenuated by institu-
tions. First, we argue that the inclusion of ethnic minorities by power-sharing 
institutions gives them the possibility to have a say in politics and, therefore, 
they develop a sense of common identity. Second, when minority groups are given 
the autonomy to preserve their group identity, e.g., in federal units, they develop 
positive feelings for the whole nation and finally a national identity. Our multi-
level analyses show that autonomy indeed attenuates the negative effect of 
minority status on national pride, but that this is not the case for inclusive institu-
tions. In light of increasing heterogeneisation of societies because of migration 
and denationalization, our findings contribute to the discussion on the relation-
ship between growing ethnic pluralism and good functioning of democratic 
regimes. 
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In research on political culture, diffuse support is defined by affective ori-
entations towards the whole political community (Dalton, 1999).1 Diffuse 
political support is seen as an important feature of political legitimacy and 
stability. According to Easton (1965a, p. 124), a political system with 
declining diffuse support must ‘either provide mechanisms to revive the 
flagging support or its days will be numbered’.
In this study, we investigate diffuse support among ethnic minorities. 
We suppose that ethnic minorities have less affective orientation towards 
the political community than do the dominating ethnic majorities. How-
ever, we expect that the gap in national identity between ethnic minorities 
and majorities can be bridged by political institutions that either include 
the preferences of minorities or allow them to autonomously organize 
their political life. 
We argue that knowing how one can strengthen the diffuse support 
of ethnic minorities is increasingly relevant. We suggest that increasing 
ethnic heterogeneity due to migration and denationalization puts the 
development of diffuse support in terms of national identity in danger. 
If this is true, the growing ethnic heterogeneity of democratic nations, 
i.e., the increasing number of different ethnic minorities within a country, 
should lead to a loss of common national identity. Among most immi-
grant countries, right wing parties stir up the debate about whether settled 
immigrants endanger national cohesion.2 Furthermore, in countries with 
historical ethnic divisions, there is a (sometimes even violent) trend toward 
more autonomy for ethnic minorities. Both developments endanger the 
formation of diffuse support. More concretely, ‘a decline in national iden-
tities would spell a crisis for the nation state and not just a crisis of the 
political system’ (Dalton, 1999, p. 72).
Of course, one could argue that multicultural developments will lead 
to more cosmopolitan forms of democracy and that diffuse support for 
1) We thank Lisa Müller, Dominik Allensbach and David Zumbach for their very helpful 
comments. Parts of the research of this article were conducted within the project ‘Democ-
racy Barometer’ that is part of the NCCR Democracy, the National Center of Competence 
in Research ‘Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century’ sponsored by the Swiss National 
Science Foundation at the centre for democracy research in Aarau (ZDA). We thank both 
institutions for their support.
2) In a recent debate in Germany, there is even a fear that the growing number of immi-
grants will lead to a stultification of the whole nation and that ‘Germany will abolish itself ’ 
(‘Deutschland schafft sich ab’). This is the title of the book by the advocate of this thesis, 
Thilo Sarrazin (2010). 
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nation states is not as important anymore as was suggested in the second 
half of the 20th century (Held, 2006, p. 290ff.). However, even if dena-
tionalization in terms of supranationalization as well as regionalization of 
politics is an ongoing process, important political decisions are still made 
at the national level. And it is exactly these decisions that further foster the 
decline of feelings of national identity among ethnic minorities. The prob-
ability that ethnic minorities also often show up as political losers is high. 
In the long run, this adds to a decline of diffuse support among ethnic 
minorities. Facing the challenge of growing heterogeneity thus means find-
ing ‘mechanisms to revive the flagging support’ (Easton, 1965a, p. 124). 
In this study, we investigate two such mechanisms that are based on 
Lijphart’s (1977, 1999) idea of consociationalism. We argue that the 
national identification of ethnic minorities can be strengthened on the one 
hand when their status as political minorities is diminished thanks to bet-
ter political inclusion. On a psychological level, this mechanism should 
create a national ‘we-feeling’ that is shared between ethnic minorities and 
the majority population, because the former are allowed to proportionally 
bring their preferences into the national political decision-making process. 
The second aspect we want to investigate in our study is based on federal-
ism. Here, ethnic minorities are allowed to arrange their affairs in a more 
or less autonomous way at a subnational level (Lijphart, 1977). Through 
this mechanism, minorities feel they belong to a given nation, because – 
in a preliminary step – they are allowed to live in their own sub-society 
that forms a part of the whole nation. In a nutshell, we test whether the 
diffuse support of ethnic minorities can be influenced by inclusion and 
autonomy.
The tests of the impact of inclusion and autonomy on the national iden-
tity of ethnic minorities are based on a cross-country comparison with 
about 30,000 individuals in 30 countries. We use those democratic coun-
tries in the World Values Survey Five Aggregated File 1981–2005 (WVS 
2009), in which there are respondents belonging to an ethnic minority 
(see table 1). We then test whether belonging to an ethnic minority does 
indeed negatively affect an individual’s national pride, whether the strength 
of this effect varies between countries, and whether this variance can be 
explained by institutions that allow for inclusion and autonomy. 
In other words, unlike previous studies (Anderson, 1998; Anderson and 
Guillory, 1997; Norris, 1999, 2004), we do not expect that institutions 
have the same impact on the diffuse support of all individuals. In contrast, 
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we argue that institutions differently influence the development of national 
identity, depending on whether an individual belongs to an ethnic minor-
ity or the majority. More precisely, the (assumed) negative effect of belong-
ing to ethnic minorities on national identity is supposed to be attenuated 
by inclusion and federalism. 
It is important to note that the respondents in the WVS who belong to 
ethnic minorities all are citizens of a country. We do not have data on cur-
rent immigrants who are building new ethnic groups within a country. 
The ethnic minorities in our sample are indigenous groups, people within 
a country who have different cultural or linguistic backgrounds or who are 
naturalised immigrants or naturalised children of migrant parents. Thus, 
our results must not be interpreted as an immediate solution to the chal-
lenge of growing heterogeneisation due to immigration. However, our 
analyses exemplify how problems of interaction and relationships between 
different ethnic groups are solved in countries with more or less established 
ethnic minorities. Thus, they serve to enlarge the discussion about mecha-
nisms that can counter the challenge of the possible decline of national 
‘we-feelings’. 
Our contribution is composed of five sections. In section 1, we elabo-
rate on the idea of lower diffuse support of ethnic minorities; in section 2, 
we consider the possible institutional mechanisms that attenuate the 
negative effect of belonging to an ethnic minority on national identity. 
Section 3 describes the method and the data. In section 4, we present the 
empirical tests. Section 5 offers our conclusions. 
1. Minorities’ Diffuse Support
The concept of political support is generally associated with David Easton 
(1965b; 1975; 1976). Easton mentions three objects of political support: 
the political community, the political regime, and the political authorities. 
The political community, which is the most important object of political 
support, represents the nation or the political system in broad terms and 
is defined as ‘a group of people who come together to draw up some kind 
of constitution to regulate their political relationship’ (Easton, 1965b, 
p. 178). 
‘Regime support’ refers to attitudes towards the constitutional order of 
a political system. Easton distinguishes between three elements of the 
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regime. First, values and principles define how the political system should 
function, e.g., whether it should be democratic or autocratic; second, the 
norms of the system involve the specific rules that govern the political 
process; finally, the political regime includes attitudes toward political 
institutions, such as the evaluation of the parliament or political parties 
(Easton, 1965b; Dalton, 2004, p. 6). 
The dimension ‘political authorities’ as the third object of political sup-
port focuses on individuals who currently hold positions of political 
authority, e.g., as prime minister or parliamentarian. Unlike the political 
regime, the focus of the third object lies on the individuals themselves and 
not on the institutions within which they work (Easton, 1965b, p. 206). 
In sum, Easton (1965a, b) distinguishes between diffuse support for the 
whole nation and specific support directed toward individuals. 
In this study, we focus on diffuse support, which is essential for the 
survival of political systems because it is relatively stable. In contrast to dif-
fuse support, specific support fluctuates and depends on the performance 
of the political authorities. Consequently, diffuse support is important to 
compensate for temporarily low specific support (Easton, 1965b, p. 272). 
In this regard, we concentrate on support for the political community 
because this is one of the most significant sources of diffuse support, which 
can stabilize a political system during times of political stress (Dalton, 
1999, p. 72). Diffuse support for the political community can manifest 
itself in a sense of ‘we-feeling’, common consciousness or group identifica-
tion (Easton, 1975, p. 447). As we focus on the level of nation states, pride 
in one’s own nation comes close to these feelings. Individual national pride 
is one of the most common indicators for support for the political com-
munity (Westle, 2009, p. 252; Dalton, 2004; Klingemann, 1999). As 
Westle (1999, p. 117) indicated, national pride is an aspect that refers to 
emotional ties to the national community, which is similar to what Easton 
calls ‘a sense of we-feeling’. Hence, our analysis focuses on support for the 
political community, measured by the level of national pride.3 As table 1 
3) Of course, the use of ‘nation pride’ as a measure of national identity has been disputed. 
The discussion centers on the difference between national identity and patriotism (see 
Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Smith & Kim, 2006). We argue that nation pride can – as one of 
the only indicators in a cross-country survey – serve as a proxy for the concept of national 
identity. As Westle (1999, p. 117) underlined, national pride refers to a feeling of emo-
tional ties towards the national community. In the case of ethnic minorities, we expect 
national pride to be an important indicator of a ‘we-feeling’ that decreases the risk of 
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below shows, national pride is high in most states. However, support for 
the political community has not been unaffected by the general decline of 
other aspects of political support (Dalton, 1999, 2004; Holmberg, 1999). 
According to Dalton (1999, p. 72), the growing emphasis on multicultur-
alism in many societies has questioned the breadth and depth of a com-
mon national identity. 
Political support mainly depends on whether people feel that their inter-
ests are well protected. In democratic states, there are always people who 
win and people who lose. However, if one group persistently wins and 
another permanently loses, the losers tend to feel excluded from the politi-
cal decision-making process, which can lead to dissatisfaction (Anderson 
and Guillory, 1997, p. 68; Norris, 1999, p. 219). Ethnic minorities  have 
a high probability of being permanently excluded, especially in majori-
tarian electoral systems. Therefore, majority rule in plural societies not 
only harm the quality of democracy or even be ‘undemocratic’ (Lijphart, 
1984, p. 22) but can also be dangerous as minorities that are continuously 
denied access to power feel excluded and lose their allegiance to the regime 
(Lijphart, 1984, p. 22f ). If such excluded groups fear for their cultural 
and physical safety, this can even lead to civil wars. Though civil wars are 
rare in consolidated democracies, the exclusion of minorities is, neverthe-
less, problematic. Low political support and feelings of political distrust 
can increase unconventional and elite-challenging actions such as protests, 
demonstrations, or political violence (Dalton, 2004, p. 11). The manage-
ment of such conflicts and the integration of different ethnic groups are 
considered some of the most serious problems facing democracies (Norris, 
2004, p. 209). 
Table 1 mostly supports our assumptions. It shows the degree of national 
pride in the overall population and among people belonging to an ethnic 
minority. We used the question of the World Values Survey on national 
pride,4 which we binomially recoded. A value of 0 summarizes the two 
categories expressing low pride in one’s nationality whereas a value of 
1 expresses (quite) high pride in one’s own nationality. As for our main 
independent movements, civil wars, or unrest due to exclusion. In other words, if people 
feel connected to their country regardless of their ethnic identity, the problems of hetero-
geneous societies mentioned above are likely to be less salient.
4) G006: How proud are you to be [nationality]? Very proud/quite proud (1) versus not 
very proud/not at all proud (0). 
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independent variable, ‘belonging to an ethnic minority’, we used the ques-
tions of the World Values Survey on the language spoken at home5 and, in 
seven cases, on ethnicity.6 Respondents who speak a language that is spo-
ken by less than 50% of the population are counted as belonging to an 
ethnic minority. The same rule was used to recode the variable of ethnicity: 
people belonging to an ethnic group that composes less than half of the 
population are coded as belonging to an ethnic minority.
According to the table, most people state that they are ‘very proud’ or 
‘quite proud’ of their nationality. However, there are significant differ-
ences between countries as well as between ethnic minorities and the 
majority of a given country. Focusing on the overall sample,7 Thailand 
indicates the highest, and Taiwan and Moldova the lowest, amount of 
national pride. The column on ethnic minorities indicates – in accordance 
with our expectations – that in most countries, ethnic minorities are less 
proud of their nationality than is the overall population. Exceptions are 
Australia, Brazil, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and Venezuela, where people belonging to an ethnic minority are 
prouder of their nationality than their compatriots. 
Most of these countries – Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Brazil, 
Venezuela, Mexico, and Australia – have introduced measures to integrate 
potentially excluded groups or to provide them with territorial autonomy. 
As we suggest that such institutions should enhance the national pride of 
ethnic minorities these results seem plausible. Furthermore, exactly such 
consensual institutions are assumed to decrease the political support of the 
majority groups (Anderson & Guillory, 1997, p. 68f ). This could explain 
5) G016: What language do you normally speak at home?
6) X051: Self-assessment of ethnic group. Used for Brazil, Dominican Republic, France, 
India, South Africa, U.S.A., and Switzerland.
7) Our sample includes 30 countries. In some countries – Japan, South Korea, or Finland – 
no or only few individuals belong to an ethnic minority group, despite our relatively unre-
strictive operationalisation. Therefore, we excluded such countries from our analysis to 
protect the results from biases. Furthermore, as can be seen in table 1, Belgium is not part 
of the sample. Of course, it would be necessary to analyse the example of Belgium since it 
is one of the prototype of consociational democracy. However, to our regret, we must 
exclude Belgium due to missing data: it was not possible to construct the variable “Ethnic 
minority”, because the question considering the language spoken at home was not asked. 
Nevertheless, we thank our anonymous reviewer for the valuable suggestion to include this 
country in our analysis. 
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the comparatively higher aggregate political support of ethnic minorities. 
In contrast, in Mali and Moldova, no such measures exist. At least in the 
case of Mali, the difference between national pride of ethnic minorities 
and the overall population is only small. The case of Moldova, however, 
needs to be explained. According to the Minority at Risk (MAR) Project 
two relevant ethnic minority groups exist in this country – the Slavic 
minority and the Gagauz (a Turkish-orthodox minority). The latter and 
the major part of the former are well integrated into the Moldavian politi-
cal life and even enjoy widespread autonomy (in the case of the Gagauz). 
This might explain, why these groups show no less support for the political 
community than their compatriots.8 
Returning to the differences between the two samples, it can be seen 
that the gap is quite small in some countries – as, for instance, in Italy, 
South Africa, Sweden, or the United States – whereas in others, the degree 
of nation pride varies considerably between ethnic minorities and majori-
ties, as in Estonia or Slovakia. However, this pattern does not seem to be 
due to characteristics of the respective ethnic minorities (e.g. due to the 
size or territorial concentration of ethnic minorities).9 Thus, there should 
be other factors, which might explain the observed pattern. Therefore, in 
8) The Gagauz enjoy widespread autonomy since Moldavia’s independence and are 
momentarily satisfied with the existing arrangements. They are represented by political 
parties and organisations and, thus, well integrated in the political system of Moldavia 
(MAR 2011). The Slavish minority group is politically and geographically divided between 
the secessionist Transdniestr region and major cities within the rest of Moldavia. The 
Slavic minority living in the cities of Moldavia is well integrated in the social and political 
system and faces no government repressions or discrimination (MAR 2011). The Slavic 
minority living in the region of Transdniestr, however, tries to build its own independent 
state, with its own government, currency and armed forces. Even though this group enjoys 
widespread autonomy it still requests complete independence (MAR 2011). However, the 
Slavic minority living in Transdniestr is rather small and does, therefore, probably not 
affect the pattern of national pride in the overall country. All in all it seems reasonable that 
the well included minority groups do not possess of less national pride than the rest of the 
population.
9) We conducted further analysis to examine whether the heterogeneity of a country 
affected the results discussed below. We used the data from Alesina et al. (2003), which 
assess the heterogeneity of a country. Of course this data measures not exactly the effect of 
the group size. However, it comes close to what we want to measure and can thus be used 
as a proxy. According to this analysis, our results seem to be stable. No major changes occur 
through the introduction of the measure of the heterogeneity of a country.
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the next paragraphs we consider factors that could be responsible for these 
country-differences.
2. ‘Mechanisms to Revive the Flagging Support’
The pattern in table 1 shows that the overall national pride in our country 
sample is quite high. However, as a rule of thumb, ethnic minorities show 
lower national identity than does the whole population. Given the increas-
ing heterogeneity, this should give us pause for reflection. Taking the idea 
of Easton for granted that low diffuse support can lead to political instabil-
ity, heterogeneity can be seen as a potential danger because it also means a 
differentiation of the society into several ethnic groups. If these groups do 
not develop a feeling of national identity, the whole political community 
is endangered. We thus should search for ‘mechanisms to revive the flag-
ging support’ (Easton, 1965a, p. 124). 
Theoretically, a country has three possible ways to react to the challenge 
of growing heterogeneity, i.e., to the danger of decreasing national 
 cohesion. First, it could try to preserve its national homogeneity by closing 
Table 1
National Pride of Majorities and Ethnic Minorities, by Country
Country Majority Ethnic 
Minorities
Country Majority Ethnic 
Minorities
Australia 95.5 97.2 Netherlands 83.4 71.4
Brazil 83.5 84.1 New Zealand 97.2 71.4
Bulgaria 81.9 74.3 Norway 89.7 79.0
Canada 98.1 93.5 Romania 84.7 77.1
Dom. Republic 95.0 86.7 Slovakia 90.4 68.8
Estonia 73.9 47.9 South Africa 97.2 94.9
France 86.9 85.1 Spain 97.0 83.1
Germany 71.2 62.5 Sweden 88.6 85.7
India 92.9 92.9 Switzerland 72.5 84.4
Italy 90.1 90.0 Taiwan 64.1 53.7
Latvia 76.7 37.2 Thailand 99.0 99.0
Lithuania 70.7 63.5 Turkey 96.6 93.2
Mali 98.3 99.2 United Kingdom 91.3 93.6
Mexico 95.0 96.1 United States 93.2 91.4
Moldova 64.1 73.4 Venezuela 98.4 98.8
Note: Share of individuals that are quite or very proud of their nation (%). 
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its borders. The remaining two ethically more justifiable possibilities cor-
respond to Lijphart’s (1969, 1977, 1999) idea of consociationalism: 
Accordingly, second, a country could try to strengthen the national iden-
tity of ethnic minorities by including them in the national decision-
making process (inclusion). Third, it could tolerate the ethnic minorities 
as an autonomous group and give them political autonomy at a sub national 
level (autonomy). Let us briefly discuss these possibilities. 
1.  Most Western democracies seem to try to opt for the ‘closing the bor-
ders’ idea by adopting restrictive immigrant policies. Supported by 
right-wing parties that benefit from the fear of heterogeneity, govern-
ments justify such policies by arguing that more ethnic diversity puts 
national identity in danger. However, we argue that this solution is not 
apt to revive national identity. Most countries already have a fairly high 
number of ethnic minorities. These can be immigrants (e.g., people of 
Turkish descendants in Germany, the people of former colonies in the 
UK) or indigenous peoples (e.g., the Maori in New Zealand). Of 
course, closing the borders will have no effect, or even a negative effect, 
the national identity of these groups we are most interested in.10 
2.  The second possibility is inclusion of ethnic minorities. From a social 
constructivist perspective, one can argue that a national identity of 
minority groups can be developed by permitting them to participate in 
national political decision-making. In heterogeneous societies the vot-
ing right alone is often not sufficient to guarantee the political inclu-
sion of ethnic minorities. Instead, as Lijphart (1977, 1999) argues, 
power-sharing institutions are needed, which enhance the representa-
tion – and thus the political inclusion – of ethnic minorities. Further-
more, power-sharing can help to construct an ‘imagined community’, 
i.e., a perception that the minority group has something in common 
with the majority (Anderson, 1991; Risse, 2002). Likewise, Lijphart 
(1999) underlines that group cooperation depends on power-sharing 
and  adequate representation of minorities. Accordingly, ethnic minori-
ties develop a national identity when they are given incentives to share 
10) One could argue that the ‘closing borders’ idea would cause immigrants to leave the 
country. The examples of the French expatriation of the Roma or the Swiss Peoples Party’s 
initiative for a deportation of criminal immigrants show that this argument is not so far off. 
However, these examples remain very questionable from a moral point of view. 
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‘an interest in playing by the rules of the game’ (Norris, 2005, p. 4). 
Contrarily, the permanent exclusion of ethnic minorities – be it volun-
tary or due to majoritarian institutions – fortifies the minority status: 
ethnic minorities also become political minorities. Permanent exclu-
sion, however, might not only lead to a withdrawal of diffuse support, 
but even to unrest or violence (Lijphart, 1999). 
3.  The third possibility is giving autonomy to ethnic minorities. We argue 
that it is easier for ethnic minorities to develop a national identity when 
they are allowed to create a group identity on their own. According to 
Risse (2002), this argument is based on an essentialist concept of col-
lective identity. The development of a national identity is only possible 
after a period of stable group identity. Group identity, however, can 
only develop when there is cultural autonomy. According to Lijphart 
(1977), a high degree of cultural autonomy is primordial for political 
stability in socially segmented societies. The most important institution 
guaranteeing autonomy is federalism. Federal units within a nation 
state are – to a defined degree – allowed to govern themselves. Thus, 
Federalism ensures that minority groups exercise control over some 
aspects of policies that are relevant to them. One could argue that this 
argument holds only for minorities that are geographically concen-
trated within a certain territory of the nation state (typical examples 
within our sample are India or Switzerland). However, we identify 
three reasons why subnational autonomy also provides advantages for 
ethnic minorities within a subnational federal unit (also see Norris, 
2005). First, smaller units enhance the chances for a minority to be 
heard and to get at least cultural autonomy. To put it simply, in a small 
unit, a minority becomes a more important group than within the 
whole nation, and, consequently, its chance of getting autonomy 
increases. Of course, the precondition is that the subnational unit has a 
certain degree of autonomy. Second, subnational autonomy can be an 
opportunity for minorities to have more political say at the subnational 
level because federalism promotes policy experimentation, and federal 
units can have different minority policies (Riker, 1975).11 Third, the 
11) In Switzerland, for example, there is a variation of voting rights for foreigners among 
the cantons (the federal units). Some cantons allow voting right for foreigners. In these 
cantons, ethnic minorities have better opportunities for having political say. 
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smaller a unit is, the higher is the probability that closeness leads to 
tolerance and mutual respect between minority and majority groups 
(Dahl, 1967). Whether this tolerance also lead to effective policies that 
allow the minority group to gain political or cultural autonomy and 
then more national pride, depends on the degree of federalism, i.e., the 
possibility for the subnational unit to install such policies. 
This discussion makes clear that institutions do not have a direct impact 
on an individual’s national identity. Inclusion and autonomy do not 
strengthen the ‘we-feeling’ of all individuals, but have different effects on 
minorities and majorities. More precisely, inclusion and autonomy do not 
increase the national identity of all citizens, but they can attenuate the 
negative effect of ethnic minority status on national identity. Technically 
speaking, we suspect a cross level interaction between institutions aiming 
at inclusion and autonomy and belonging to an ethnic minority. 
3. Research Design, Data and Method
To test our assumptions about the interactive institutional impact on the 
diffuse support of ethnic minorities, we proceed in two steps, using the 
following determinants. First, we test whether belonging to ethnic minor-
ities indeed has a negative impact on the feeling of national identity, i.e., 
national pride, and whether this impact varies between the different coun-
tries in our sample. If this was not the case, it would make no sense to 
suggest a differing cross-level impact of institutions. 
Additionally, we control for the most important individual determi-
nants of diffuse support. In the literature, socio-economic variables such as 
gender,12 age,13 education,14 and income15 as well as political factors such as 
12) X001: sex: 1 = female; 0 = male.
13) X003R: This means you are __ years old. The variable was recoded into six intervals 
(15–24; 25–34; 35–44; 45–54; 55–64; and 65 and older).
14) X025R: What is the highest educational level that you have attained? This variable was 
recoded into three levels: lower, middle, higher.
15) X047: Scale of income: 1–10, where 1 indicates the lowest 10 the highest income 
level.
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the level of political interest16 and the level of confidence in parliament,17 
are often found to influence political attitudes (Norris, 1999; Anderson & 
Guillory, 1997; Waldron-Moore, 1999). It is expected that women show 
a lower level of political support than men since they are still politically 
underrepresented and therefore partially excluded from the political pro-
cess (Norris, 2004, p. 179). Furthermore, various studies indicate that 
younger people evaluate the political system generally more critically than 
do older people, which can lead to a lower level of political support if 
young people’s expectations remain unfulfilled (Waldron-Moore, 1999, 
p. 37). The effect of educational level appears less clear. On the one hand, 
it is possible that less educated people feel disadvantaged and become mar-
ginalized, which leads to a decrease in their political support. On the other 
hand, more educated people tend to be more critical of the political sys-
tem, because they support strong democratic ideals that compete with the 
actual practice of democratic politics (Dalton, 2004, pp. 83–86). The 
effect of economic well-being on support is a widely studied aspect in 
political science (Dalton, 2004; McAllister, 1999; Alesina & Wacziarg, 
2000). Many studies indicate that the support of the government is signifi-
cantly influenced by an individual’s economic situation because voters 
expect the government to ensure a high level of economic development. 
This would mean that individuals with high incomes show more diffuse 
support than low income individuals (Clarke et al., 1993). 
Both political factors are expected to increase the level of support for the 
political community. First, high political interest should foster political 
support because it affects political understanding and strengthens a feeling 
of being able to influence the political process (Anderson & Guillory, 
1997, p. 72). Second, Easton (1965b, 1975) argued that ongoing low spe-
cific support should eventually lead to an individual’s loss of diffuse sup-
port. We account for this factor by controlling for an individual’s 
confidence in the national parliament. 
16) E023: How interested would you say you are in politics? Low values indicate low polit-
ical interest. 
17) E075: I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me 
how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence/quite a lot of con-
fidence (1), not very much confidence or none at all (0)? 
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To sum up, in the first step we test the following hypotheses: 
H1: Individuals belonging to ethnic minorities have less national pride than 
do individuals belonging to the national ethnic majority.
H2: The strength of the negative effect of belonging to ethnic minorities var-
ies between countries.
In the second step, we model the interactive effect of the institutional 
determinants. More precisely, we investigate whether a political system 
enabling political inclusion and political autonomy attenuates the negative 
effect of belonging to minority groups on national pride. Thus, we are not 
interested in the direct effect of institutions on diffuse support, but on the 
indirect interactive one. In other words, we do not assume that institutions 
foster diffuse support, but that they have a moderating impact on effects of 
individual characteristics on individual behaviour and attitudes. 
The two mechanisms are measured with three institutions each: 
For inclusion, we based our investigation on Lijphart’s (1977, 1999) 
original idea of consociationalism and argue that it is the electoral system 
as well as the type and the size of the government that can have a more or 
less inclusive character (Anderson, 1998). First, Proportional Representa-
tion (PR) electoral systems are more inclusive than majoritarian systems 
because they enhance the probability that more parties and politicians rep-
resenting diverse ethnic groups are included in the policy-making process. 
In turn, the danger of marginalising ethnic minorities concerning their 
political preferences decreases, and diffuse support increases (Banducci 
et al., 1999).18 Second, the probability that all parties continue to have a 
stake in the policy-making process is higher in parliamentary systems than 
in winner-take-all presidential systems. ‘As the cabinet in a parliamentary 
system is a collegial decision-making body – as opposed to the presidential 
one-person executive with a purely advisory cabinet – it offers the optimal 
setting for forming a broad power-sharing executive’ (Lijphart, 2004, 
p. 101).19 Third, even if there are several parties in the parliament, the 
most important indicator of effective political inclusion is the size of the 
18) Keefer (2009): Database of political Institutions: Proportional Representation? (1 if yes, 
0 if no). 
19) Keefer (2009): Database of Political Institutions: System: Parliamentary (1), Presiden-
tial (and assembly elected presidents) (0). 
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government coalition, i.e., the number of effective parties in the govern-
ment. It is argued that consensual and inclusive power-sharing works best 
within a large executive.20
To measure the degree of autonomy in a given country, we draw upon 
research on federalism (Gerring & Thacker, 2005). Lijphart (1999) argued 
that federalism is invaluable for group autonomy in divided societies. For 
our purposes, we concentrated on institutional settings that allow spatially 
concentrated but also spatially dispersed ethnic minorities the freedom to 
manage their own affairs, to protect their cultural autonomy, or give them 
at least a chance to get minority rights. Drawing upon Gerring and Thacker 
(2005), we highlight three ideas. First, autonomy is higher when there is 
the possibility for subnational elections. Local electoral competition can 
increase the incentives of public officials to be responsive to the preferences 
of local inhabitants (Qian & Weingast, 1997), including the preferences 
of minorities. More responsiveness should then lead to more diffuse 
support for all ethnic groups.21 Second, to be effectively autonomous, fed-
eral units must have authority over taxing, spending, and legislating.22 
A third indicator for the importance of subnational units is bicameralism. 
Bicameralism is seen as a determinant of ‘a permanent and highly institu-
tionalized sharing of responsibilities between a national authority and 
semi-autonomous regional units’ (Gerring & Thacker, 2005, p. 304).23
As we do for the individual level, we also control for several country 
characteristics that are supposed to influence national identity at the macro 
level. Klingemann (1999) for instance argued that the age of a democratic 
system and the wealth of a nation are determinants of the overall diffuse 
support within this nation: older and established democracies24 as well as 
20) Nordsiek, Wolfram (2010): Parties and Elections. The database about parliamentary 
elections and political parties in Europe; African Election Database http://africanelections
.tripod.com/ [11.10.2010]; diverse national websites on government composition. 
21) Keefer (2009): Database of Political Institutions: State: Are there state/province govern-
ments locally elected? (0) if neither local executive nor local legislature are locally elected, 
(1) if one or both are locally elected. 
22) Keefer (2009): Database of Political Institutions: Author: Do the state/provinces have 
authority over taxing, spending, or legislating? If 1 for any of these, category gets a 1. 
Authority over ‘cultural affairs’, or ‘planning’ in Communist systems does not qualify. 
23) Johnson & Wallack (2006): Database of Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote. 
Bicameralism: Dummy variable, 1 if bicameral system.
24) Treisman (2006): The number of consecutive years since 1930 that the system had been 
democratic as of 2000, updated for the current study.
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countries with a high GDP per capita25 show a higher mean diffuse sup-
port than younger and poorer democracies. We further control for popula-
tion size. Matsubayashi (2007) for instance showed that diffuse support 
increases with decreasing population size.26 
In the second step, we test these hypotheses: 
H3: The negative effect of belonging to an ethnic minority on an individual’s 
national pride is attenuated by inclusive institutions, i.e., PR instead of 
majoritarian electoral systems, parliamentary instead of presidential systems, 
and a high number of effective governmental parties. 
H4: The negative effect of belonging to an ethnic minority on an individual’s 
national pride is attenuated by institutions allowing autonomy at a federal 
unit, i.e., elections for subnational authorities, subnational authority, and 
bicameralism.
To test hypotheses 1 to 4, we use multilevel analysis that allows us to 
model a varying effect of the belonging to ethnic minorities on national 
pride (step 1) and explaining this variance by the interactive impact of 
inclusion and autonomy (step 2). 
The underlying principle of multilevel modelling is that intercepts of 
common linear ordinary least square (OLS)-regression analysis are allowed 
to vary around an overall mean: 
(1) yij = β0j + β1X1ij +εij, whereas 
(2) β0j = β0 + μ0j (μ0j stands for the residuals at the contextual level).
Additionally, multilevel models allow for modelling of cross-level interac-
tion, thus measuring the influence of contextual factors on the strength of 
the connection between response and predictor variables on the lower level – 
methodologically speaking, the steepness of the slope. 
Our dependent variable has a dichotomous form. Therefore, we do not 
use OLS regression for our estimation, but transform the dependent vari-
able in a logit structure. Estimation and interpretation for logit-multilevel 
analysis are similar to conventional logit analysis (see, for example, Long, 
25) World Bank (2010): World Development Indicators: GDP per Capita (current US$) 
in 1000.
26) World Bank (2010): World Development Indicators. Population in 1000. 
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1997). Schematically, the models on which our analyses are based will 
have this form:
(3)  log it (πij) = β1 + β2 X2ij + . . . + βn Xnij + α1W1j + . . . + αnWnj + γ1Wkj Xkij + 
εij + μkj Xkij + μ0j
The national pride (y) of an individual i within a country j is explained by 
an overall mean of nation pride (β1), individual characteristics (X, their 
estimates β respectively), contextual factors (W, their estimates α respec-
tively), cross-level interaction terms of the minority status (Xk) and the 
respective institutional variables (Wk) (Wkj Xkij, their estimates γ respec-
tively), whereas the effect of the estimate is randomised (βkj), contextual 
variation (μ0j with an assumed mean of 0 and a total between context vari-
ance of σ2μ), individual variation (εij with an assumed mean of 0 and a total 
within context variance of σ2), and slope variation (μkj Xkij). The overall 
variation (σ2μ + σ2) is divided into differences at the individual level (level 
1 variance), which will be explained by individual characteristics, and dif-
ferences between contexts (level 2 variance), which will be explained by 
contextual factors, whereas the slope variance shall be explained by the 
interaction terms. 
We defer to a more thorough discussion on the method and refer to the 
relevant literature on multilevel analysis (Hox, 2010; Jones, 1997; Snijders & 
Bosker, 1999; Teachman & Crowder, 2002).
4. Empirical Results
The first step is depicted in table 2. As one can observe from the null model 
(model 1), national pride varies significantly between the countries. 
According to this model, one fourth of the overall variance of individual 
national pride is due to contextual differences.27 Furthermore, belonging 
to ethnic minorities indeed reduces the national pride of an individual 
(model 2): Individuals belonging to an ethnic minority have a lower prob-
ability of being proud of the nation than do individuals belonging to the 
27) In a logit-model, the share of variance of the individual level accords to 3.29 (Snjiders & 
Bosker, 1999, p. 224); the overall variance (3.29 + .97 = 4.26) thus can be attributed to 
23% to the context (.97/4.26) and to 67% to the individual characteristics (3.29/4.26). 
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majority group. More precisely, all other things being equal, our models 
predict a probability to have national identity for minorities of 83%, 
whereas the probability of majorities being proud of the nation is 88%. As 
suggested, model 3 shows that the strength of this effect differs signifi-
cantly between the countries (model 3). This means that there are coun-
tries where the negative effect of belonging to ethnic minorities is stronger 
than in other countries. In the second step, we will test whether this vari-
ance can be explained by inclusion and autonomy. 
The negative impact of belonging to ethnic minorities and the signifi-
cant variance of this impact persist when we control for important indi-
vidual and contextual characteristics (model 4). Women are less proud of 
their nation than men, and a high education level lowers national identity, 
whereas more income increases one’s national pride. Additionally, older 
people tend to be prouder of their nation than younger people. Both polit-
ical factors have an impact on national pride, too: the more an individual 
is interested in politics and the higher his or her confidence in the parlia-
ment is, the more likely it is that this person will be proud of his or her 
nation. The latter indicator is by far the strongest. This could be inter-
preted as a confirmation of Easton’s (1965 a, b) idea that specific support 
in the long run influences diffuse support. What is most important for our 
purposes is that the negative effect of minority status is not influenced by 
the other individual factors. Furthermore, table 2 reveals that national 
pride of all individuals is higher in older than in younger democracies. 
However, wealth seems not to have a positive effect on national pride. On 
the contrary, the higher the GDP per capita in a country, the lower is the 
probability that an individual living in this country is proud of it. Further 
analyses not presented here show that it is not the wealth of a nation but 
the economic growth that is important for diffuse support (measured as 
the average of the growth rates of the GDP of the past 10 years). Thus, the 
actual situation compared with other countries does not seem to be impor-
tant for the development of national pride; instead, it is the long-term 
development of the economic situation which affects diffuse support. 
Table 3 shows the results of the second step of our investigation. For 
each of the six institutions, we model a cross-level interaction. In other 
words: we test whether the existence of an institution indeed diminishes 
the negative effect of the minority status on national pride. This is indi-
cated by a positive and significant interaction term (built with the  minority 
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variable and the corresponding institution). As one can observe from 
table 3, two out of the six institutions exert the supposed attenuating effect: 
authority (model 9) and bicameralism (model 10). In countries where fed-
eral units have authority over taxing, spending, and legislating, the nega-
tive effect of belonging to an ethnic minority on national pride is weaker 
Table 2
Explaining national pride, individual level 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Fixed Effects
Constant 1.86 (.18)** 1.94 (.18)** 1.91 (.18)** 1.50 (.19)**
Individual Level
Ethnic Minority – –.34 (.04)** –.37 (.16)* –.30 (.15)*
Gender – – – –.09 (.04)*
Age – – – .50 (.06)**
Education – – – –.37 (.06)**
Income – – – .26 (.07)**
Political interest – – – .31 (.06)**
Confidence in parliament – – – .59 (.04)**
Contextual Level
Population .05 (88)
GDP pc –2.82 (.83)**
Age of democracy 2.43 (.53)**
Random Effects – –
Individual level (σ2) 1 (0)** 1 (0)** 1 (0)** 1 (0)**
Contextual level (σμ02) .98 (.25)** .98 (.26)** .93 (.25)** .72 (.19)**
Slope Variance – – .57 (.18)** .46 (.15)**
Covariance – – –.10 (.15) –.26 (.13)
Model properties 
Number of cases 
(countries)
32170 (30) 32170 (30) 32170 (30) 32170 (30)
Wald ( Joint χ2) 105.3 (1) 163.9 (2) 111.8 (2) 596.6 (11)
Note: Not standardised coefficients with standard errors in brackets; all independent variables 
rescaled on a scale of 0–1 where 0 indicates the lowest value and 1 the highest value of the vari-
able. Coefficients therefore indicate the change associated with moving from the lowest to the 
highest value. The Wald test is an approximate Chi2 based test of the fit of the model; * signifi-
cant at the 95% level; ** significant at the 1% level.
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than in countries without subnational entities that dispose of such author-
ity. The same holds true for bicameralism: an individual belonging to an 
ethnic minority has a higher probability of being proud of his nation when 
he lives in a country where the protection of the autonomy of federal units 
is guaranteed by bicameralism. Current discussions regarding interaction 
models propose more precise interpretations (see Brambor et al. 2005). It 
is argued that one needs to calculate marginal effects and the correspond-
ing standard errors to interpret the interaction effects correctly. Strictly 
speaking, our interaction results only show the results for the absence of 
the two power dividing institutions. In other words: the effect of belong-
ing to a minority group is negative in countries without subnational 
authority and bicameralism. However, we have to admit that the interac-
tion terms are not significant any more at the presence of the institutions. 
This simply means that the variance of the effect in the countries with the 
two institutional settings is too large to have a significant effect. We can 
interpret these findings alternatively, stating that subnational authority 
and bicameralism are necessary but not sufficient conditions for moderat-
ing the negative effect of belonging to minority groups on national pride. 
Nevertheless, we still consider our results as a sign of a moderating effect 
of authority and bicameralism foremost because the number of countries 
is relatively small.
The significant negative covariance terms within the autonomy-models 
(models 9 to 12) show an interesting pattern. When we group the countries 
with and without bicameralism/authority, it leads to the interesting situa-
tion that the negative effect of minority status in countries with subnational 
entities that dispose of authority over taxing, spending, and legislating even 
becomes positive (see figure 1). This result is in line with the finding of 
Anderson and Guillory (1997) concerning the differing impact of consen-
sual institutions on minorities and majorities: In our analyses, the national 
pride of an individual belonging to an ethnic minority and living in a coun-
try with bicameralism and regional authority is not only higher than that of 
an individual living in a unicameral and centralized country, but on aver-
age, it is even higher than that of an individual living in the same country 
but belonging to the ethnic majority group. 
The remaining four institutions do not show the assumed attenuating 
effect. None of the three institutions measuring inclusion has an effect 
on the relationship between ethnic minority status and national identity 
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measured by national pride. The interaction effects of the electoral and the 
governmental system are even negative. If these effects were significant, 
this would mean that within PR and parliamentary systems, the negative 
effect of belonging to an ethnic minority on a national ‘we-feeling’ would 
be even more aggravated. Of course, both interactive effects do not meet 
the significance criterion. Nevertheless, given the overall results, we con-
clude that autonomy seems to work better than inclusion in integrating 
minorities into the political community. In other words, the negative 
effect of minority status on a national we-feeling might be attenuated by 
giving autonomy to federal units. Contrarily, political inclusion and 
power-sharing seem to have no effect on the development of national iden-
tity of minority group members. 
Figure 1
The interactive impact of bicameralism and authority on the national pride 
of ethnic minorities
Notes: the x-axis depicts the majority on the left side and the minority groups on 
the right side; the y-axis depicts the probability of having national pride for 
minorities/majorities in bicameral systems (smoother slope) and in unicameral 
systems (steeper slope) at the left and the probability of having national pride for 
minorities/majorities in countries where the federal units have authority over tax-
ing, spending, and legislating (smoother slope) and in countries without such 
authority (steeper slope), all other things being equal (models 9 and 10 with all 
individual variables (except minority and the interaction variable) = 0).
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5. Concluding Remarks
The main aim of our study is the investigation of the determinants of a 
common national identity. We argue that growing heterogeneity due to 
growing migration and denationalization challenges the national cohesion. 
Basing on Easton’s (1965a, b) argument that low diffuse support endan-
gers the stability of a democratic regime, we analyse the different national 
we-feelings of ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities. We show that indi-
viduals belonging to ethnic minorities normally have a lower propensity to 
develop a national identity than their compatriots belonging to the ethnic 
majority of a given country. Even if our data consists of established minor-
ities, i.e., ethnic minorities that are (naturalized) citizens, we argue that 
this result can be seen as a sign that growing ethnic heterogeneisation in 
terms of an increase in the number of different ethnic minorities could 
have a negative effect on the development of overall diffuse support and 
could finally destabilize democracies. It is therefore important to investi-
gate possible remedies to the suggested decline of diffuse support due to 
low national identity of minority groups. 
In this article, we focused on two possible institutional remedies. Based 
on Lijphart’s (1977, 1999) idea of consociational democracy, we argue 
that inclusion and autonomy can attenuate the negative effect of belong-
ing to an ethnic minority group on national identity. We model interac-
tive impacts of institutions allowing for power-sharing and subnational 
autonomy. Our results show that autonomy might help to strengthen the 
national identity of minorities: The negative effect of belonging to an eth-
nic minority is attenuated by bicameralism and local authority. In other 
words, an individual belonging to an ethnic minority and living in a coun-
try where federal units have authority over taxing, spending, and legislat-
ing and where the autonomy of federal units is ensured by a second 
chamber has a higher propensity of being proud of the nation he or she 
lives in than a member of a minority group with exactly the same indi-
vidual  characteristics who lives in a centralized country with no or non-
autonomous federal units with unicameralism. Our results further suggest 
that inclusion does not have the same effect. Power-sharing institutions 
such as PR, parliamentary instead of presidential systems, and the number 
of effective parties in the government do not attenuate the negative impact 
of ethnic minorities on national identity. These results show that the 
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different dimensions of consociational democracy must not necessarily 
exert the same impacts. 
These results also can be taken as a sign that the development of national 
identity of ethnic minorities is more probable when they are given the pos-
sibility of living autonomously in their own culture in subnational entities, 
whereas political inclusion in terms of power-sharing has no effect. We 
conclude that giving autonomy to ethnic minorities can be a promising 
‘mechanism to revive the flagging support’ (Easton, 1965a, p. 124), i.e., to 
strengthen the development of a ‘we-feeling’ of ethnic minorities. 
Of course, the results must be interpreted with caution. At least three 
critical points must be taken into consideration. First, the results assume a 
zero-sum game: higher diffuse support of ethnic minorities thanks to 
decentralisation goes hand in hand with a lower diffuse support of majori-
ties. Second, negatively interpreted, our results suggest the installing of 
potentially dangerous parallel societies as a possible remedy. Third, the 
data we use can only give a vague insight into the complexity of ethnic 
heterogeneity. Hereafter, we discuss these three drawbacks. 
•  First, our results assume a zero-sum game. As figure 1 shows, rendering 
autonomy for ethnic minorities, on the one hand, seems to foster the 
development of diffuse support of individuals belonging to ethnic 
minorities. On the other hand, vertical power-sharing also goes at the 
expense of the majority group’s national pride. In fact, bicameralism 
and local authority seem to foster the ethnic minorities’ diffuse support 
while simultaneously lowering the national identity of the ethnic major-
ity. However, Figure 1 also reveals that the difference in we-feeling 
between ethnic majorities in countries with local authority and bicam-
eralism and ethnic majorities in countries without these institutions is 
quite small. The gap in national identity between ethnic minorities that 
are given autonomy to live their own culture and those that live in a 
country without such permissions, however, is huge. We therefore argue 
for more subnational autonomy in favour of ethnic minorities: With 
regard to growing heterogeneity, the small loss of national pride of the 
ethnic majority is outweighed by the benefit of the growing we-feeling 
by the ethnic minorities. 
•  Do our results propagate parallel societies? In fact, giving autonomy to 
ethnic minorities to live their own culture for strengthening national 
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cohesion seems to be a contradictory suggestion. One could argue that 
federalism and autonomy harm a national and collective identity. This 
could also lead to parallel societies of ethnic minorities that are cut off 
from their neighbours with other ethnic backgrounds, and this could 
lead to claims for even more autonomy, and finally even to secession. 
However, our results can be seen as a sign for a more optimistic view: 
autonomy leads to a more positive view of the country that allows that 
freedom. Based on these results, we argue that tolerance in terms of 
allowing for cultural independence is not only a sign of respect, but also 
bear fruits in terms of growing national identity.
•  Finally, ethnic minorities are often heavily underrepresented in surveys. 
Taking part in surveys normally depends on the ability to speak one of 
the official languages of a country in which the survey is conducted. 
Furthermore, individuals who do not act upon their political rights are 
often not even surveyed. As mentioned, the minorities in our sample are 
not immigrants, or at least are not first-generation immigrants. Thus, 
our results must be taken as an example of how democracies with ‘estab-
lished’ minorities face the challenge of ethnic diversity. The results can 
nevertheless be taken as a sign of long term integration: in the long run, 
ethnic minorities develop a ‘we-feeling’ when they are allowed to first 
live their original culture. Of course, the data does not allow for longi-
tudinal developments. However, the cross-country analysis with younger 
and older democracies can at least serve as a first approach to such long-
term integration. To conduct better investigations of the challenge of 
growing heterogeneisation for national cohesion, we need better data. 
Such data should for instance allow the inclusion of the size or the power 
of an ethnic minority group. Furthermore, such data should include 
immigrants and allow for long-term observation. Finally as discussed 
above, the results of the interaction terms have to be interpreted with 
caution, since we cannot observe significant effects for all relevant 
values. Since the data sample is quite small, however, we believe that 
we might still interpret our results as signs of moderating effects. To 
 summarize, our results cannot offer more than first tentative insights 
into an increasingly important and complex field. 
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